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I. Introduction
The dominant response of the international community to international crimes,
to the extent that this has been channelled through the law of international
responsibility, has been to allocate responsibility to individuals. Its symbol is the
prosecution of individual perpetrators through international criminal courts and
domestic courts, that many regard as the most significant manifestation of the core
values that unite the international community. The dominance of the individualistic
response to international crimes can be traced to the Nuremberg Tribunal that held
that "[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced.",
2
* Andr6 Nollkaemper is Professor of Public International Law at the faculty of Law of the
Universitity of Amsterdam. He is member of the Advisory Commission on Public
International Law of the Netherlands and the Standing Committee of Experts in
International Refugee and Criminal Law and of-counsel at Bohler, Franken Koppen
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1. The present article expands on ideas contained in the authors' introductory and concluding
chapters in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andr6 Nollkaemper &
Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009).
2. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL NUREMBERG, 22 THE TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOv
1945 - 1 OCT 1946, p. 447 (1947)(emphasis added). This was not the first time that the
focus had shifted from the collective to the individual. In article 227 of the Versailles
Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers "publicly arraign[ed] Wilhelm II of
8 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010)
The individualistic approach to responsibility for international crimes is based
on the idea that collective action is the product of individual action and that if we
are to change collective action, we have to get to the individual level. 3 Hersch
Lauterpacht wrote in this context that "there is cogency in the view that unless
responsibility is imputed and attached to persons of flesh and blood, it rests with
no one."
4
However, in most situations in which the international community takes an
interest in the prosecution of international crimes, the role of the individual
perpetrators can only be understood and explained by considering the role of
states, that to a large extent cause such crimes to happen. The involvement of states
in international crimes does not necessarily mean that the state commits an
international crime-a concept that continues to be absent from positive
international law. But there is a wide variety of ways in which a wrongful act by
the state can involve international crimes, for instance, when the state fails to
prevent the commission of international crimes, or when it fails to punish
individual perpetrators. 5 As will be developed in section 2 of this article, the
involvement of states in the commission of international crimes adds a systemic
element that largely is beyond the scope of the law of individual responsibility.
The question then arises whether the law of state responsibility is better
positioned to address systemic causes of international crimes. To what extent are
its principles and procedures attuned to the systemic context and causes of
international crimes?
Hohenzollern, formerly German emperor, for a supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties," and article 2228 obliged Germany to extradite her
officials responsible for war crimes on request of any Allied Power in order to be judged by
their military tribunals. However, eventually only 8 persons, not including the former
emperor, were sentenced. Gattini notes that "[t]he times were obviously not yet ready to
separate, for conceptual as much as for practical purposes, the responsibility of the State
from that of individuals." Andrea Gattini, A Historical Perspective: From Collective to
Individual Responsibility and Back, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 104.
3. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 67 (2000).
4. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 40 (Archon Books
1968) (1950). For a further discussion of the reasons for the shift to the individual, see
Gerry Simpson, Men and Abstract Entities: Individual Responsibility and Collective Guilt
in International Criminal Law, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 69.
5. Each of these three possibilities was present in the ICJ's Judgment in Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Serb. & Mont.), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (Feb. 26 2007) [hereinafter Genocide Case].
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The problem addressed in this article can be illustrated by the allocation of
responsibility for the international crimes allegedly committed in the past few
years in Darfur. The Prosecutor of the ICC concluded that these crimes were part
of a larger organizational context:
The information gathered points to an ongoing pattern of crimes committed
with the mobilization of the whole state apparatus. The coordination of different
bureaucracies, ranging from the military to the public information domains,
suggest the existence of a plan approved and managed by GoS authorities at the
highest level.6
The Prosecutor responded to this involvement of the state apparatus by indicting
president Omar al-Bashir.7 The request for an arrest warrant states that Omar al-
Bashir "committed crimes through members of the state apparatus, the army and
the Militia/Janjaweed. ' '8 While this suggested that Omar al-Bashir used the
organization, rather than the other way around, there is a strong argument,
developed below,9 that the organizational context in itself can be a causal factor. If
so, the question presents itself whether and how the law of state responsibility can
deal with this organizational context.
The question of state responsibility for international crimes has become a fertile
terrain for international legal studies, in particular following the Judgment of the
ICJ in the Genocide Case. 10 However, the scholarly attention for this topic remains
6. Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Seventh Report of the Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593,
98 (2005).
7. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Application
for Warrant of Arrest under Art. 58, (July 14, 2008), available at www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33-05C3-4E9C-A672-
3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf.
8. Id.
9. Infra § 2.
10. See, e.g., STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL, XXXIV THESAURUS ACROASIUM
(Kalliopi K. Koufa ed., Sakkoulas Publications 2006); Mark Gibney, Genocide and State
Responsibility, 7 HuM. RIGHTS L. REV. 760, 760-773 (2007); Marko Milanovic, State
Responsibility for Genodice: A Follow-up, 18 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 669, 669-694 (2007);
NINA JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2003);
Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitively Yes!, 10 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 425,
425-44 (1999); Ant6nio Augusto Cangado Trindade, Complementarity between State
Responsibility and Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: the
Crime of State Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY
OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 253-269 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005);
BEATRICE BONAFt, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2009).
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very modest compared to the research conducted on individual responsibility, and
many fundamental questions remain open.
The article consists of the following parts. I first will expand on the proposition
that most international crimes are characterised by their systemic causes and
context. In section 3, I will discuss the ways in which the law of individual
responsibility have been adjusted to cope with the systemic context of international
crimes. In section 4, I will focus on the ways in which the law of state
responsibility may connect to the systemic context of international crimes. In
section 5, I examine the role of the Security Council in addressing, in terms that
are related to the law of state responsibility, the systemic causes of international
crimes. In section 6, I will draw some conclusions.
II. The Systemic Nature of International Crimes
The term system criminality was coined by B.V.A. Rling, who used the
concept to refer to a situation where "governments order crimes to be committed,
or encourage the commitment, or favour and permit or tolerate the committing of
crimes."'" He argued that the commission of war crimes "serves the system, and is
caused by the system."' 2 In this article I will build on this definition of R61ing, and
define system criminality as a situation where collective entities order or
encourage international crimes to be committed, or permit or tolerate the
committing of international crimes. 13
Most international crimes are part of system criminality. Notable examples of
situations of system criminality after the Second World War include the 'dirty war'
in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s; 14 the atrocities committed during the Balkan
Wars of the early 1990s, in which states and organized armed groups played a
dominant role; 15 and the crimes committed during the ongoing armed conflicts in
11. Bert V. A. R6ing, The Significance of the Laws of War, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON UN LAW AND ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Dott.
A. Giuffr6 Editore 1975).
12. Id.
13. The definition is closely related to Kelman's concept of crimes of obedience. See Herbert C.
Kelman, The Policy Context of International Crimes, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 26.
14. MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, EXTRAORDINARY EVIL AND HANNAH ARENDT: CRIMINAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR (2001).
15. ARNE J. VETLESEN, EVIL AND HUMAN AGENCY: UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE
EVILDOING (2005).
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the Darfur area in Sudan.' 6 The practice of torture by the United States after 9/11
falls squarely in this category. 
17
The systemic nature of international crimes is recognized in the definitions of
international crimes.' 8 That certainly is true for crimes of genocide1 9 and crimes
against humanity. 20 Although a Trial Chamber of the ICTY deemed the case of the
lone g~nocidaire theoretically possible,2 ' genocide as such does not seem possible
without the involvement of a larger collectivity. 22 The situation for war crimes is
slightly different in that, compared to genocide and crimes against humanity, these
are more likely to be committed as individual acts. However, war distinguishes
itself from individual ordinary crimes by its organized nature, and more often than
not war crimes will have the systemic element as required by the definition of
system criminality. Note also that the ICC statute provides that the Court has
jurisdiction over such crimes "in particular when committed as part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes." 23 The systematic
16. United Nations, Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (Jan. 25, 2005),
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/cominq_darfur.pdf.
17. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE (2008).
18. Otto Triffierer, Prosecution of States for Crimes of State, 67 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT PENAL 346 (1966); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
121 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/121/8140.pdf (noting that such acts "are definitionally State acts."). This
last remark should be qualified to encompass other organized groups that may oppose the
state. See also Jann Kleffier, Accountability of Non-state Actors for System Crimes, in
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 238.
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. During the negotiations of the Genocide Convention, the United
Kingdom took the position that the Convention should be directed at states and not
individuals, as it was impossible to blame any particular individual for actions for which
whole governments or states are responsible. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 419 (Cambridge University Press 2000). Also Denmark considered
that in cases of genocide or aggression, the responsibility cannot be limited to the individual
acting on behalf of the state. Id. at 442.
20. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity as acts "when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population.").
21. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 100-101 (Dec. 14, 1999).
22. See, e.g., Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v.
Domestic Jurisdiction. Reflections on the van Anraat Case, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 242
(2006) ("[lIt would be simply preposterous for an individual to boast that by his actions
alone he could achieve the goal of destroying a whole group. In the normal situation, the
perpetrator of genocide may at the most feel confident that his conduct might contribute to
the concerted action of annihilating the group.").
23. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 8(1).
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nature of crimes is particularly clear for aggression. Though not (yet) within the
jurisdiction of the ICC, it is generally accepted that persons can only commit
aggression if they order or participate actively in the planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of aggression by a state.24 Finally, also torture is characterized
as an official act. Though acts of torture of course can be committed by state
officials against official policy (and as such not be part of system criminality as
defined in this chapter), there would seem to be many cases where torture indeed
has a systematic character and is condoned and perhaps supported by the policy of
an organization, exemplified by the events in Abu Ghraib.25
The state is the prime form of a collective entity that is involved in system
criminality. R61ing indeed confined his analysis of system criminality to states.26
However, states are not the only form of such collectivities. They also may include
organized armed groups 27 or (ruling) political parties, as in the case of Nazi
Germany or the Communist Party of China during the Cultural Revolution.28 In
Rwanda, the genocide was in part caused by collective groups such as the
Interahamwe and the newspaper Kangura. The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) found in the Nahimana case: "Through fear-mongering and hate
propaganda, Kangura paved the way for genocide in Rwanda, whipping the Hutu
population into a killing frenzy. ' ' 29 In particular cases, crimes may be committed or
caused by a small group of individuals that constitute the leadership of collectivity.
Tomuschat notes that mostly the commission of crimes by a state "means that a
people has fallen pray to a criminal leadership."
30
24. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Discussion Paper Proposed
by the Coordinator, PCNICC/2002/WCGA/RT. 1/Rev. 1 (Apr. 1, 2002); see also Daniel N.
Nsereko, Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 71
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 497, 518 (2002).
25. THE ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS, THE OFFICIAL INDEPENDENT PANEL AND PENTAGON
REPORTS ON THE SHOCKING PRISONER ABUSE IN IRAQ (Steven Strasser ed., Public Affairs
2004); see also Kelman, supra note 13, at 30.
26. Roling, supra note 11.
27. Kleffner, supra note 18.
28. VETLESEN, supra note 15, at 44-45 (discussing the impact of the Nazi party on the German
state and highlighting that the explanatory variable for the holocaust was to be found at the
level of the party rather than of the state).
29. Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and sentence, 950 (Dec. 3 2003); See Nina Jorgensen,
Criminality of Organizations under International Law, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 219.
30. CHRISTIAN TOMuSCHAT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENSURING THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND
ON THE EVE OF A NEW CENTURY: GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 290
(1999).
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States, as collective entities, may contribute in several ways to the commission
of international crimes. In situations where state authorities consider that the
security of the state is under severe threat or fear they may loose power,3' when
they have a powerful apparatus at their disposal charged with protecting the
security of the state, and when they have identified groups that are defined as
enemies of the state, collective entities themselves can turn into actors that commit
or further the commission of international crimes. 32 This was what happened, for
instance, in relation to the criminal acts orchestrated or supported by Belgrade
during the Balkan wars33 and also what happened during the Bush administration
in response to the war on terror.
34
In many situations, international crimes will be 'systematic' in the sense that
they are part of a plan or policy, that often will remain in place, even if an
individual author of a criminal act is removed.35 It is such a plan or policy that
often will underlie, induce and explain widespread authorization of acts of violence
and that lead will lead to a rule governed practice that results in routinized
36violence. In particular cases the policy may be reflected in legislation, for
instance laws or regulations that allow for the practice of torture or systematic
discrimination of minorities; however, that is not a necessary feature.37
A collective entity also may contribute to international crimes climate by doing
little else than sitting still and acquiescing, by systematically not acting when
individuals commit international crimes which further the objectives of the state.38
31. Hannah Arendt noted that "loss of power becomes a temptation to substitute violence for
power," HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 54 (1969). She also wrote "that every decrease
in power is an open invitation to violence-if only because those who hold power and feel
it slipping from their hands, be they the government or.. .the governed, have always found it
difficult to resist the temptation to substitute violence for it." Id. at 87.
32. Kelman, supra note 13, at 34-35.
33. VETLESEN, supra note 15, at 178.
34. See generally MAYER, supra note 17 (discussing this issue comprehensively).
35. But see Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 8(1), which uses such qualifications to limit the
jurisdiction of the ICC in regard to international crimes.
36. Kelman, supra note 13, at 26-27; ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST
21 (1989); VETLESEN, supra note 15, at 16. See also OSIEL, supra note 14, at 64.
37. MAYER, supra note 17, at 7-8 (discussing the legalization of torture by the US).
38. Christenson notes: "benign neglect of State may serve many subjective political purposes.
Indeed, through loose reins government inaction can function as easily as a conscious part
of the prudent exercise of power," Gordon A. Christenson, Attributing Acts of Omission to
the State, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 312, 316 (1991). See also Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of
States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,367 (1999) (noting
that international lawyers characterize offenses in Rwanda regions "as crimes of states,
because such offenses, either by definition or because of their scale or scope, tend to require
the connivance or at least acquiescence of governmental authority.").
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States also may provide the material conditions needed for the commission of
international crimes. Furthermore, states may provide aid and assistance to
individual authors of crimes, for instance by providing training, weapons, or
funding. 39 This may create the conditions for a continued pattern of crimes, even
when individual perpetrators are removed.
Perhaps the most important mechanism by which collectivities contribute to
international crimes is through their influence on the normative climate. R61ing
noted that the characteristic feature of system criminality is that it corresponds with
the "prevailing climate in the system., 40  Punch points to processes of
neutralization and rationalization that may influence individual behaviour. 41 Thus,
a crucial aspect of system criminality is that individual crimes are not, as is
commonly the case for domestic crimes, contrary to a norm; rather they are in
conformity with norms that result from collective processes. 42 The normative
climate may be fostered by widespread authorization of acts of violence and the
routinization of violence by rule governed practice. It may also be induced more
directly through incitement and propaganda, dehumanisation of victims of violence
by indoctrination, and other policies directed at changing the normative climate.
As long as such fundamental processes are in play, responses that only are
focussed on a limited number of individual perpetrators may not always be
effective. One individual simply may be replaced by someone else. Individual
perpetrators who have been the subject of criminal proceedings at the ICTY, ICTR,
ICC or domestic courts, often were small cogs in larger systems that may be
39. That may make it appropriate to label the involvement of the system in terms of complicity.
See CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 139 (1993). The
international law of responsibility would not in technical terms recognize such involvement
as aid or assistance in the sense of Article 16 of the draft articles on State Responsibility;
that only applies between states. See Genocide Case, supra note 5, 420. However, in the
specific case of genocide, where the Court found that a state can act in breach of the
principle of complicity as that applies to individual responsibility, this may be different. Id.
40. R6ling, supra note 11, at 138.
41. Maurice Punch, Why organizations kill and get away with it: the failure of law to cope with
crime in organizations, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at
54.
42. Immi Tallgren, The Sense and Sensibility of International Criminal Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L.
L. 561, 575 (2002). See also Kelman, supra note 13, at 26. It should be noted that this
generally involves a two way process: acts of criminality use a climate for justification and
at the same time contribute to that climate. See WELLS, supra note 39, at 125-26. See also
George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of
Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L. J. 1499, 1541 (2002) (implying the above when he refers to
how the "climate of moral degeneracy" produced by the "collective" contributes to the
crime).
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beyond the reach of individual responsibility. Similarly, it may be thought doubtful
whether holding Saddam Hussein individually responsible in, say 1991, would
have made much of a difference, as the party and government could have
continued to support crimes that were committed later.43
In regard to the international crimes committed in Darfur, for instance, the
Prosecutor of the ICC initially indicted two individuals who he thought were
responsible for international crimes. 4 But it was hard to believe that Ahmad
Muhammed Harum, former Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of
Sudan, on his own committed or was responsible for the crimes that were been
committed in Sudan or even for the crimes in respect to which he was charged. 45 It
is equally hard to believe that Ali Muhammed Ali Adb-Al-Rahman, a leader of the
Janjaweed, indicted by the ICC, on his own caused the various crimes that have
been attributed to the Janjaweed.46 As indicated above, after his recognition in his
2008 report to the Security Council the Prosecutor of the ICC that these two
individuals were part of a much larger organizational context,47 the Prosecutor
indicted Omar al-Bashir. But the question is whether this is sufficient to address
the involvement of 'the whole state apparatus' to which the Prosecutor referred.
Targeting responses to system criminality at individual authors of crimes is only
a partial solution that does not always take away the need for addressing the larger
entities of which individuals are a part. If the goal is termination of the crimes and
prevention of their recurrence, individual responsibility is unlikely to do the job.
Individual authors of international crimes then often are part of a context in
which a variety of actors participate, and that are properly dealt with at the level of
the state, or other entity, as such.4t Hannah Arendt wrote on the acts of Eichmann:
43. See also Gattini, supra note 2, at 120 (noting with regard to smart sanctions that "[for all
their laudable concern for the plight of the innocent and suffering population under a
totalitarian regime, the supporters of smart sanctions forget that [more often than not,] a
totalitarian regime cannot be reduced to a handful of leading personalities, but rather it rests
upon a complex network of relations involving large sectors of the society.").
44. See also ICC Press Release, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur, ICC-
OTP-0606-104 (June 6,2005).
45. See Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07-01, Decision on
the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute (Apr. 27, 2007).
46. Id.
47. See Seventh Report of the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 6, 98.
48. See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY, pt. 1, 130
(1983); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, State Fault and the Forms and Degrees of International
Responsibility: Questions of Attribution and Relevance, in Le droit international au service
de la paix, de la justice et du drveloppement 35(M6langes Michel Virally ed., Pedone,
1991).
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"crimes of this kind were, and could only be, committed under a criminal law and
by a criminal state.",49 Tallgren writes that "instead of being exceptional acts of
cruelty by exceptionally bad people, international crimes are typically perpetrated
by unexceptional people often acting under the authority of a state or, more
loosely, in accordance with the political objectives of a state or other entity." 5
0
Fletcher exposes what he calls a "romantic view of history and personality" in
which the individual's behaviour is motivated by, and can only be understood in
reference to, larger communities of nation, state or tribe.51 The emphasis on
individual responsibility "obscures a basic truth" about war crimes that these are
"deeds that by their very nature are committed by groups and typically against
individuals and members of groups.,
52
Thus, the basis of the dogma of individual responsibility that "[c]rimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international
law be enforced ' 53 is doubtful. Jennings rightly noted that the words of the
Nuremberg Tribunal are "net and high sounding but dangerous, not to say
dishonest, half-truth[s]" that have "a considerable currency with the great and the
good, who have been willing to deceive themselves into believing that this
aphorism represented the essence of wisdom.,
54
It may be argued that focussing our attention on systemic causes has one major
drawback, as it may result in collective responsibility of the state and/or
population. It may confront innocent individual members of that collectivity with
49. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 240
(1963); Karl Jaspers, Who Should Have Tried Eichmann, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 853
(2006); WELLS, supra note 39, at 135 (noting that many proceed from the belief that "in
general, corporate criminal acts are not the result of the isolated activity of a single
employee, but arise 'from the complex interactions of many agents in a bureaucratic
setting."').
50. Tallgren, supra note 42, at 575.
51. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT IN THE AGE OF
TERRORISM (2002).
52. George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of
Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002); Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein,
Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24
HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 618 (2002); Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual
Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539, 570-571 (2005).
53. THE TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 2, at 447 (emphasis added).
54. Robert Jennings, The Pinochet Extradition Case in the English Courts, in GEORGE ABI-
SAAB, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN QUEST OF EQUITY AND UNIVERSALITY 693
(L. Boisson de Chazournes and V. Gowlland-Debbas eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2001).
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the consequences of criminal acts of a few.55 This is a standard critique on
traditional (say, pre-World War II) international law. 56 Collective responsibility
would be primitive and immoral in view of its effects on innocent members of a
collectivity. 57 Scharf and Williams note that "the first function of justice is to
expose the individuals responsible for atrocities and to avoid assigning guilt to an
entire people., 58  Cassese writes: "Collective responsibility is no longer
acceptable." 59 Resorting to collective responsibility would thus be a step back to
the primitive collective responsibility from which the international legal order has
just liberated itself
Several responses can be offered. First, as indicated above, in many instances of
international crimes, dealing only with individuals will fail to remove the cause of
the atrocities. If the international community is to address that cause there may not
be an alternative for some form of collective responsibility. Indeed, in particular
situations, responses targeted at the level of the collective are justified because a
large part of the population or 'members' of a group in fact were co-responsible for
failing to prevent, for instance, the rise of a political party or a leader who led the
55. SHANE DARCY, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Xvi (2007); VETLESEN, supra note 15, at 158; cf, UNOG Press
Release, 'Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Holds Special Session on Human
Rights Situation on Occupied Arab Territories', Un Doc. HR/HRC/06/031E (July 5, 2006)
available at
http://www.unog.ch/80257631003154D9/%28httpNewsByYear-en%29/80257631003154D
9C12571A2004F2783?OpenDocument (last visited March 4, 2010); Presentation by John
Dugard, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories on the effects of the sanctions against Hamas on the Palestian people (noting that
that it was not the Hamas Government that was being punished as a result of the sanctions,
but the Palestinian people), available at http://www.hic-
mena.org/documents/Dugard%205_06_07.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
56. See, e.g., Francesco Parisi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise and Fall of Communal
Liability in Ancient Law, 24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 489 (2004); Daryl J. Levinson,
Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 351-360 (2003); See generally GREGORY F.
MELLEMA, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, ch.4 (1997).
57. HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES LECTURES, 97-98 (1942); See also Sanford Levinson, Responsibility for Crimes of
War, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 244, 246 (1973) (stating that "[n]o sanction can be directed at an
organization-whether the method chosen if a fine or dissolution-without also affecting at
least some of the individuals with ties to the entity.").
58. Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, The Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the
Peace-Building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAW 161, 170 (2003); MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOUR 170 (Penguin 1999).
59. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 136 (2003).
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collective into the criminal acts.6° In some cases, a substantial part of the group
indeed was involved in the crimes, as was the case in Rwanda during the genocide
in the early 1990s 61 and in Nazi-Germany.
62
Second, collective sanctions do not necessarily have effects for all members of
the collectivity.63 While in theory it may be true that sanctions imposed on a
collectivity affect members of that collectivity, in the practice of international
reparations that certainly does not seem to be the case in any substantial way.
Darcy notes that "for citizens who are the constituent members of a State, the
impact upon them of any consequences of state responsibility is usually
negligible." 64 The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission recognized the effects of
reparation for the population of the responsible state was a relevant factor to take
into account in determining levels of reparation 65 and rejected, partly on this
ground, claims for substantial moral damages.
66
60. Int'l. L. Comm'n [ILC], Fifth Report on State Responsibility, 266, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/453
and Add. 1-3 (May 12 & 28, June 8 & 24, 1993) (prepared by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz,
Special Rapporteur).
61. See Alvarez, supra note 38, at 467-68 (noting that "[w]hen one percent of a country's
population is under arrest for such offences, amid credible charges that millions were
involved in atrocities, an attempt to dissemble on the scope of likely complicity is likely to
fail."); Mark A. Drumbl, Pluralizing International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1295, 1311 (2005)(reviewing FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Phillipe Sands, ed., Cambridge University Press
2003); Compare HERMANN MANNHEIM, GROUP PROBLEMS IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
44 (1955) (distinguishing "various connections between individual and collective
responsibility" and singling out "collective responsibility for mass crime," in which the
larger group is held responsible "for crime committed by some considerable section of its
members.").
62. Gattini, supra note 2, at 108 (noting that "[i]t is true that under the Nazi dictatorship and
during the war the vast majority of Germans personally committed no crime, but it is
somehow too self-indulgent, not to say self-absolving, to maintain that for that reason they
could not collectively be held morally nor legally responsible.").
63. TOMUSCHAT, supra note 30, at 293.
64. DARCY, supra note 55, at xvii; see, e.g., International Crisis Group, After Mecca: Engaging
Hamas, MIDDLE EAST REPORT 62, Feb. 28, 2007,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4677 (discussing effects of the sanctions on
Hamas).
65. Eri. v. Eth., Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n, Final Award: Eritrea's Damages Claims, 21 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2009) (noting that "[h]uge awards of compensation by their nature would require
large diversions of national resources from the paying country-and its citizens needing
health care, education and other public services-to the recipient country. In this regard, the
prevailing practice of States in the years since the Treaty of Versailles has been to give very
significant weight to the needs of the affected population in determining amounts sought as
post-war reparations.").
66. Id. 61 (stating that "[t]he Commission has great reservations regarding Ethiopia's moral
damages claims. These claims seek billions of dollars, amounts wholly disproportionate to
Systematic Effects of International Responsibility for International Crimes
Third, as regards the objection that collective responsibility would (re-
)introduce the notion of collective guilt in international law, it can be noted that
responses targeted at the level of the system, in any case if these do not entail
criminal responses, need not carry the connotation of collective guilt. They can be
of a fundamentally different nature than individual criminal responsibility to which
the idea of guilt is inherent. 67 As noted by Michael Walzer, the distribution of costs
over a population that may result from state responsibility for international cries is
not the distribution of guilt.
68
Finally, it has been said that the focus on systems may have destabilizing
effects. 69 For instance, it might undermine efforts of newly formed democracies or
governments to stabilize a society after a period of reconstruction. The punishment
of the German State (and society) in Versailles may be blamed for the breakdown
of the European order in the 1930s and 1940s. 70 The effects of the isolation of
Hamas in Palestine may be a modern case a point,71 as is the adverse effects of 'de-
Bathification' on the stabilization and development of Iraq.72 Larry Cata Backer
argues that for this reason individual responsibility indeed often prevails: the
Eritrea's limited economic capacity. They realistically could not be paid, or could be paid
only at unacceptable cost to Eritrea's population for years to come. Large per capita awards
of moral damages may be logical and appropriate in some contexts involving significant
injuries to an individual or to identifiable members of small groups. The concept cannot
reasonably be expanded to situations involving claimed moral injury to whole populations
of large areas.").
67. Thomas Franck, Individual Criminal Liability and Collective Civil Responsibility: Do They
Reinforce or Contradict One Another, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 567, 570 (2007).
68. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, 297 (1977).
69. Mark Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics of Criminal Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 22 HUM.
RTS Q. 120 (2000); see, e.g., Eric Schmitt, The Struggle for Iraq: Reconstruction; U.S.
Generals Fault Ban on Hussein's Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004, at All (citing a US
general, who stated that the "de-Baathification" policy had caused many Sunnis to feel
"disenfranchised" from the emerging Iraqi government which had created a destabilizing
effect).
70. Simpson, supra note 4, at 80.
71. Nathan J. Brown, The Peace Process Has No Clothes - The Decay of the Palestinian and
the International Response, in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT WEB COMMENTARY: MIDDLE
EAST PROGRAM, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/BrownCommentaryjune072.pdf
(last visited July 3, 2008); See generally, United Nations Seminar on Assistance to the
Palestinian People, Doha, Feb. 5-6, 2007, available at http://unispaL.un.org/
UNISPAL.NSF/fd807e46661e3689852570d00069e918/9b020962bbde8ee2852572f8005fl
1 f3 !OpenDocument.
72. See, e.g., Walid Phares & RG Rabil, De-Bathification Went too Far, HISTORY NEWS
NETWORK, http://hnn.us/articles/4624.html.
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individual is sacrificed so that the group can continue.73 This may explain the one-
dimensional (because mainly focused on individuals) international responses to the
crimes committed by Serbian agents or by groups and individuals that acted with
the support of Serbia-the international community had a prime interest to let the
state of Serbia continue and re-establish itself quickly as a stable political entity.
This objection needs to be taken seriously. However, it will have to be balanced
against the objectives of responsibility in relation to system criminality: is stability
more valuable than incapacitating a regime that is responsible for mass atrocities?
One will have to take into account that while responses to system criminality may
delegitimize regimes, they do not necessarily incapacitate them.
III. Systemic Effects of Individual Responsibility
At first sight, individual responsibility may seem ill-suited for dealing with
systemic causes of international crimes. By definition it is based on individual
action and individual intent. Indeed, the very nature of system criminality
obliterates the piecemeal approach of criminal law. Criminal law is not capable of
capturing the complex mechanisms and relations of organizations which engage in
mass crimes. The mere removal of individual perpetrators from the scene, if even
they would be in a leadership position, would not necessarily make a difference in
regard to the systemic conditions of international crimes.
Nonetheless, the law of individual responsibility offers several leads for
addressing problems of system criminality. In assessing the weight thereof, it may
be necessary to distinguish between situations where the conflict in which the
crimes were committed was terminated, and situations where they are ongoing.
Most prosecutions of international crimes fall in the former category, and
individual perpetrators were prosecuted after the situation in which the crimes
were committed had been terminated. The prosecution of Milosevic, Saddam
Hussein and the defendants in the ICTR and the Khmer Rouge Tribunals are cases
in point. The possible impacts of individual responsibility on systemic effects may
be quite different in cases of prosecution of individual perpetrators in ongoing
crimes, as was contemplated in regard to Darfur and the Gaza.
7 4
73. Larry Catd Backer, The Fuhrer Principle of International Law: Individual Responsibility
and Collective Punishment, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 509 (2003).
74. See U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the
Gaza Conflict, Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, T
1766, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48 (2009).
Systematic Effects of International Responsibility for International Crimes
It has been suggested that enforcing individual responsibility may have a
deterrent effect. 75 Although the assumptions underlying such deterrence are shaky,
both for future individual perpetrators 76 and for collectivities, 77 there is some
evidence that under certain conditions, prosecution may result in norm
internationalization.78 In view of the strong supportive effect of the normative
climate on situations of system criminality, this may have a transformative effect
on the normative climate and thereby undermine some of the conditions that
facilitate systemic forms of criminality.
Individual responsibility also in a more direct way may affect systemic
conditions underlying international crimes. The international criminal law
paradigm of individual responsibility has widened its scope and has increasingly
attempted to address the collective nature of international crimes.79
In particular cases, leaders may use the organization of a state or other
collective entity to create the conditions for system criminality. This may be
qualified under art. 25(3)(a) of the ICC statute, providing for responsibility for a
person who "[c]ommits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is
criminally responsible." This is one of the grounds of the indictment of Bashir. The
arrest warrant notes that he "committed crimes through members of the state
apparatus, the army and the Militia/Janjaweed." These crimes thus were a form of
indirect perpetration or perpetration by means.8 0 If and to the extent that the
systemic conditions indeed are the result of intentional acts of leaders, prosecuting
such leaders may remove (part of) such conditions.
75. Trindade, supra note 10, at 266.
76. Tallgren, supra note 42, at 575; see also MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169-170 (2007) (referring to long-standing criminological research,
Drumbl notes that the very low chance that offenders are ever accused adversely affects the
assumed effectiveness of deterrence theory).
77. Drumbl, supra note 52, at 589.
78. See generally Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization through Trials for Violations
of International Law: Four Conditions for Success and their Application to Trials of
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming Sept. 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477075 (discussing four necessary, but not necessarily sufficient,
conditions for the success of norm internalization in the community of the defendant:
consistency, selectivity, accessibility, and integration).
79. Andrew Clapham, Issues of complexity, complicity and complementarity: from the
Nuremberg trials to the dawn of the new International Criminal Court, in FROM
NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 62
(Philippe Sands ed., Cambridge University Press 2003); Drumbl, supra note 52, at 540-41;
BONAFt, supra note 10, at 172.
80. Omar Hassan AhmadAl Bashir, supra note 7, at 1.
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A second approach that somehow may address systemic causes is the doctrine
of superior responsibility. s1 Individuals who transgress fundamental norms of
international law often will not act on their own initiative and for their own cause,
but will carry out plans of other, higher placed individuals. This may, under the
doctrines of superior or command responsibility, result in prosecutions of higher
ranked officials that supplement the prosecution of the lower ranked official; or
may lead to a decision not to prosecute such lower ranked officials.
8 2
The concept of superior responsibility conveys the idea that legal and moral
standards in situations of armed conflict will only be observed if soldiers are
subject to responsible command. Military commanders can be held accountable if
they fail to prevent or repress violations of international humanitarian law by their
subordinates. This legal construction recognizes that military structures and
organizations may be conducive to system criminality and so not only those who
physically commit the crimes, but also those in the higher echelons who have the
power and authority to prevent those crimes should be held responsible.
Of course, this doctrine remains firmly planted in the individual paradigm. It
assumes that the problem can be solved by individual responsibility, which
contradicts the very idea of system criminality. However, if the doctrine is used to
address the leadership of a state or other collectivity, there may exist a link
between the system level and individual responsibility. A climate of
permissiveness for abuses, or a pattern of orders to conduct torture may be broken
by removing the leaders who instructed or tolerated crimes. It must be added,
though, that only in very rare situations is individual responsibility allocated to the
true leadership. More often than not, both in international tribunals and domestic
courts, the buck stops at mid-level in the bureaucracy, Abu Ghraib being a case in
point. There, prosecutions were directed at lower officials but they all eventually
failed. 3
81. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 28.
82. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstiq, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 724 (Aug. 2, 2001); see
generally Kai Ambos, Command Responsibility and Organisationsherrschaft: ways of
attributing international crimes to the 'most responsible,' in SYsTEM CRIMINALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 127.
83. See, e.g., Ben Nuckols, Military prosecution in Abu Ghraib scandal ends, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2008, available at
www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/01/l1 /military-proseution in abu_ghraibsca
ndal ends/.
Systematic Effects of International Responsibility for International Crimes
A third form of individual responsibility that is attuned to situations of system
criminality, is the Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) doctrine. 84 This combines
elements of concepts like conspiracy, complicity and participation in a criminal
organization. In view of the rather broad application of the doctrine in the recent
case law of the ICTY, the concept does reach beyond the level of the individual
85
and can connect to collectivities in which individuals participated.
The indictment of Charles Taylor before the Special Court for Sierra Leone
shows clear dimensions of the systematic nature of the international crimes he is
charged with:
The Accused committed the crimes alleged in the Amended Indictment in the
sense of being a co-perpetrator of those crimes, in that, while not physically
perpetrating the crimes, the Accused shared the intent to commit the crimes and
participated in the common plan, design or purpose which amounted to or involved
commission of those crimesFalseThe alleged crimes, amounting to or involved
within the common plan, design or purpose, were either intended by the Accused,
or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the common plan design or
86purpose.
Likewise, Slobodan Milosevic was accused of participating in three very large
joint criminal enterprises. The Trial Chamber found at the conclusion of the
prosecution case that a reasonable trier of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that Milosevic was a participant in a joint criminal enterprise that included
the Bosnian Serb leadership, and that he shared with its participants the aim and
intention to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a group,87 notably because
"[t]he Accused was the dominant political figure in Serbia and he had profound
influence over the Bosnian Serb political and military authorities.
'
"
88
In the ICTR case of Rwamakuba, and in reference to the post-Second World
War cases, the Appeals Chamber held that "liability for participation in a criminal
84. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 25.
85. See generally, Harmen van der Wilt, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Functional
Perpetration, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 158.
Osiel argues that the ICTY's preference for JCE might be influenced by the Prosecutor's
desire to achieve the conviction of as many suspects as possible; Osiel, supra note 69, at
1812-1821.
86. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Second Amended
Indictment (May 29, 2007).
87. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal, 288 (June 16, 2004).
88. Id. 257.
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plan is as wide as the plan itself, even if the plan amounts to a "nation wide
government-organized system of cruelty and injustice."8 9
JCE, like superior responsibility, remains grounded on the principles of
individual responsibility. It has been said that JCE is difficult to reconcile with
principles of individual responsibility. Indeed, the doctrine displays the
fundamental tension between the law of individual responsibility and the notion of
systemic crimes.90 However, it is to be recalled that the collectivities that are
engaged in system criminality may involve smaller groups or, as noted by
Tomuschat, a criminal leadership of an entity like a state. 91 In such cases, JCE may
be able to provide a basis for prosecution of all or the main persons involved in
such a criminal leadership. Removing that leadership may in such a case remove a
cause of system criminality. Gattini rightly notes that the concept of JCE, with its
somewhat more liberal evidentiary standards, is particularly suitable to tackle mass
atrocities, which are as a rule the result of a complex network of connivances.
92
There is a fourth option within the paradigm of the law of individual
responsibility that would to some extent address the agency problem. This is to
hold the organization as such criminally responsible. This approach was used in
Nuremberg as an indirect approach to individual responsibility. In essence, the
Nuremberg Tribunal could declare an indicted group or organization to be
criminal, which would mean that in subsequent proceedings the criminal nature of
the group or organization could not be challenged.93 The Tribunal advanced as the
definition of a criminal group or organization that there must be "a group bound
together and organised for a common purpose. The group must be formed or used
in connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter."94 After
Nuremberg, however, statutes of international criminal courts have not chosen this
approach, though arguably this approach could have helped to address the
collective nature of crimes, without relying unduly on the JCE doctrine.
95
89. Prosecutor v. Andrd Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of
Genocide, 25 (July 23, 2004).
90. See also Van der Wilt, supra note 85, at 158.
91. TOMUSCHAT, supra note 30, at 290.
92. Gattini, supra note 2 at 121.
93. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 10, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.
94. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal: The Accused Organizations (IMT
Judgment) (Sept. 30 and Oct. 1, 1946), available
athttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judorg.asp.
95. Jorgensen, supra note 29.
Systematic Effects of International Responsibility for International Crimes
In sum, despite its individualistic approach, the law of individual responsibility
may in particular situations be relevant to particular situations of system
criminality and indeed weaken the conditions under which criminality can be of a
systemic nature when regimes are dominated by a small leadership and their
removal on the basis of the principle of perpetration by means (assuming that the
organization is in the hands of that leadership) may undermine the systemic
conditions for international crimes. In situations of small criminal regimes, the
doctrine of JCE may capture part of that regime, in particular higher leaders. In
these respects, the law of individual responsibility to some extent has been able to
solve the agency gap.
It needs to be recalled that with the exception of the state, there is no true
alternative for individual responsibility and that in respect to international crimes
committed by armed groups, rebel movements etc., the law of individual
responsibility remains, at least within the paradigm of responsibility, the only
option.96 Moreover, even though the state can be subject to international
responsibility, the consequences, compared to those for individuals, are relatively
powerless and fall short of punishment. The ICTY noted in the Blaskic case that
... under international law States could not be subject to sanctions akin to those
provided for in national criminal justice systems.' 97
There is one final aspect to consider. Prosecution of individual state organs can
be seen as a sanction against the state itself.98 It is to be recalled that in the
traditional law of international responsibility, individuals (and their fault) were
invisible behind the state. Indeed, traditionally, orders to prosecute individuals as a
form of satisfaction have been considered as undue interference in the internal
affairs of states. 99 In modern international law, individuals whose acts caused the
96. Compare Kleffner, supra note 18.
97. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, 14 March 1997, Judgment on the request
of the Republic of Croatia for review of the decision of Trial Chamber It of 18 July 1997,
para 25; see also Simpson, supra note 4, at 74.
98. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and
International Responsibility of the State, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1085, 1091 (Antonia Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (noting
that "the promoters of the various international criminal courts undoubtedly intended, by
punishing individuals, also to punish the actions of the State to which the acts may be
attributed); See also Trindade, supra note 10, at 265.
99. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Document A/CN.4/448
and Add.1, Comments and observations received from Governments, in [1993] 2:1 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 59, 76-81, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.I (Part 1). In the
commentary to the draft articles, it was noted that this provision "covered a domestic
concern regarding disciplinary action against officials which should not be covered in the
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responsibility of the state are no longer "hidden," but are themselves subjects of
international responsibility. The loss of control of the state over the immunity of its
officials, in particular those at the higher level, in itself is a sanction that affects the
state. Dupuy notes that "the promoters of the various international criminal courts
undoubtedly intended, by punishing individuals, also to punish the actions of the
State to which the acts may be attributed."' 00 Though the effect of that sanction in
itself on the systemic conditions of international crimes remains speculative, this
principle does allow us to cross the bridge from the responsibility of individual
leaders to the level at which crimes frequently are caused-that of the state.
IV. Systemic Effects of State Responsibility
4.1 Types of involvement of states in international crimes
States can be involved in the commission of international crimes, and thus
responsible for their occurrence in several ways. The two ways that are most
directly relevant to systemic nature of international crimes are, first, the
commission of crimes itself, and second, the use of non-state actors to commit
international crimes and/or the failure to prevent such international crimes.
First, states can be directly responsible for acts that, at the individual level, are
qualified as international crimes. This will be so when the prohibition of the
international crime is binding on the state in question, the acts of individual
perpetrators can be attributed to the state, and these acts amount to a breach of the
prohibition of the crime as it is binding on the state. It is to be taken into account
here that the norms that prohibit certain acts by the state are not necessarily the
same as those applying to individuals-but in substance they apply to and
proscribe the same acts. 101 This is true, for instance, for aggression,'
°2 genocide,'0 3
crimes against humanity, 104 torture,'
°5 and terrorism.' °6
draft articles." Int'l L. Comm'n. [ILC], Report of the International Law Commission on the
work of its fifty-first session (1999), 1 72, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/504, (Feb. 8, 2000), available
at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO0/279/60/PDF/NO027960.pdf?OpenElement.
100. Dupuy, supra note 98, at 1091; See also Triffterer, supra note 18, at 346 (noting that the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals are "typically committed at least partly
by persons who act as government representations on behalf of the state or with the silent
toleration or even active support of the state" and that a judgment of individual criminal
responsibility in many cases "implies an obiter dictum" about the engagement of the state
itself in these crimes).
101. See generally BONAFt, supra note 10, at 23-31.
Systematic Effects of International Responsibility for International Crimes
102. Individual responsibility was recognized in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal of Nuremberg art. 4, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. While the ICC (temporarily)
excludes aggression from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, see Rome
Statute, supra note 19, art. 5 (1998), this does not necessarily affect individual
responsibility. For state responsibility see Military and Paramilitary Activities Case (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and
Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29th Sess., 2319th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 14, 1974). See also YORAM DINSTErN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (2001).
103. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, No. 1021 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7, para. 2, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192
[hereinafter I.C.T.Y. Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory
of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 art. 2, 2, Nov. 8,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602 [hereinafter I.C.T.R. Statute]; Rome Statute, supra note 19, art.27.
The ICJ indicated already in its 1996 judgment that state responsibility can not only arise
for failure to prevent or punish individuals committing genocide, but also for an act of
genocide perpetrated by the state itself. See Case concerning Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.),
Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595, 32 (July 11). For the argument that the norms are
not the same, see Paola Gaeta, On What Conditions can a State be held Responsible for
Genocide?, 18 E.J.I.L. 631-648 (2007).
104. For individual responsibility see, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 7. State
responsibility for crimes of humanity is expressly recognized for the crime of apartheid. See
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
arts. 1, 2, Nov. 30, 1975, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 18, 1976). A Greek
Court has held that violations of art. 46 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 could be
qualified as crimes against humanity. See Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of
Germany, Greek Court of Cassation, May 4, 2000, reported in 3 Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 511, 514-515 (2000). Otherwise, acts for which individuals could be
charged with crimes against humanity could in any case be considered in terms of state
responsibility for (gross) violations of human rights.
105. "Under current international humanitarian law, in addition to individual criminal liability,
State responsibility may ensue as a result of State officials engaging in torture or failing to
prevent torture or to punish torturers." Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95/17/1,
Judgment, 142 (Dec. 10, 1998).
106. Individuals can be held responsible for terrorism under, e.g., the 2000 International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, 54th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Feb. 25, 2000), and the 1998 International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998). In his dissenting opinion in the Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie case, President Schwebel suggested that the Montreal Convention "may be
interpreted to imply that the Convention does not apply to allegations against persons
accused of destroying an aircraft who are claimed, as in the instant case, to be acting as
agents of a contracting State." Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971
Montreal Convention arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1998 I.C.J
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Second, to the extent that acts of individual authors of international crimes are
not attributable to a state, that state may nonetheless incur responsibility if it
actively supports, perhaps even relies on, such actors to achieve aims of state
policy.10 7 In the alternative, a state may fail to act to prevent such non-attributable
acts. 1 8 This latter aspect is also the legal core of the principle of responsibility to
protect. 109
The distinction between these two categories may in particular cases be thin.
Acts of omission often are not simply the result of impotence or lack of
unawareness of the threats to which a state should respond, but can equally be
active forms of policy. Christenson notes: "Though obligatory concerted action
may be demanded by an international norm or directive, benign neglect of State
may serve many subjective political purposes. Indeed, through loose reins
government inaction can function as easily as a conscious part of the prudent
exercise of power."110 Moreover, when conditions of knowledge, foreseeability,
intent and causation are satisfied, responsibility based on failure to control or
prevent may come close to attribution for purposes of state responsibility." 1
9, 64 (Feb. 27) (dissenting opinion of President Schwebel). However, his wording is
cautious and Judge Schwebel subsequently proceeded on the assumption that the
Convention does apply to persons allegedly State agents who are accused of destroying an
aircraft. Id. Judge Bedjaoui noted that the words "any person" in art.1 of the Montreal
Convention mean that "the Convention applies very broadly to 'any' person, whether that
person acts on his own account or on behalf of any organization or on the instructions of a
State." Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J 114, 147 (Apr. 14) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Bedjaoui). As to state responsibility, see generally L. Condorelli, The
Imputability to States of Acts of International Terrorism, 19 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 233
(1989), and Sompon Sucharitkul, Terrorism as an International Crime: Questions of
Responsibility and Complicity, 19 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 247, 252 (1989).
107. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 102, 110, 115.
108. See Genocide Convention, supra note 103, art. 1; see also Alvarez, supra note 38, at 367
(noting that "international lawyers characterize offenses in [Rwanda] as crimes of states,
because such offenses, either by definition or because of their scale or scope, tend to require
the connivance or at least acquiescence of governmental authority.").
109. See The Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the
Secretary-General, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009);
see also Carsten Staln, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal
Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99 (2007).
110. Christenson, supra note 38, at 316 (citing 1 WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND
BURKE 464-71, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION at 3, 5 (Philip B Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Note, though, that important differences exist in the required
proof for a wrongful act: responsibility is based on some form of fault rather than objective
responsibility. Id. Christenson, supra note 38, at 321-322, 362; Abraham D. Sofaer,
Terrorism, the Law and the National Self-Defence, 126 MIL. L. REV 89, 102-104 (1989).
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In either case, the state can be involved in the commission of international
crimes in a way that will trigger an internationally wrongful act and that thereby
opens the door to application of the principles of reparation.
4.2 The role of state responsibility in regard to international crimes
At this point, it has to be recognized that the law of international responsibility
has only a relatively minor role to play in regards to system criminality. The
international legal order has at its disposal a variety of "tools" to address causes
and effects of system criminality, including such instruments as military
intervention, economic sanctions, political pressure by states or international
organizations, development aid, etcetera.'12
These generally can have significant effects on the wrongdoing state in question
and may go a long way towards addressing the systemic conditions of international
crimes. Eventually, one way or another, such conditions were removed in Nazi-
Germany, Cambodia and Iraq. The way in which the international community,
even if often too late, may crack down on states involved in system criminality
may well be compared with criminal responses to individuals. Simpson rightly
notes that narrow definitions of criminal law (requiring criminal courts or
incarceration (Blaskic) need to be modified when we contemplate the way in which
certain states are stigmatised and punished by international society. "
3
However, the fact of the matter is that in the toolbox for responding to state
involvement in international crimes, state responsibility is only one of those tools,
and certainly not the most important. Many states, including the United States,
have taken the position that the proper responses of the international community
towards cases of system criminality are to be left to political organs, rather than to
the domain of international responsibility. 114 This also explains the demise of the
concept of "state crimes, ",115 as well as more generally the virtual non-use of state
responsibility in situations of system criminality. The law of responsibility was not
112. W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of
Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (1996).
113. Simpson, supra note 4, at 78 (footnote call number omitted).
114. Int'l L. Comm'n [ILC], State Responsibility: Comments and Observations received from
Governments, 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515 (Mar. 19, 2001); see also JAMES CRAWFORD,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 247
(2002).
115. See, e.g., Eric Wyler, From 'State Crime' to Responsibility for 'Serious Breaches of
Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General International Law', 13 EUR. J. INT'L L.
1147 (2002).
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a major factor in, for instance, dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa, or
the regimes of Pol Pot, Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein. Several scholars,
including Jennings and Koskeniemmi, have pointed out that in this area
international law may be better served by political processes than by formal
responsibility. 11
6
There is a noticeable difference between the domestic level and the international
level. While domestically responsibility (notably individual criminal
responsibility) is seen as the harshest intervention, this certainly is not true at the
international level (though it may be true for an individual target). 117 Other means
target the state much more directly, e.g. sanctions and military intervention. 
11 8
The Genocide Case before the ICJ was a rare exception to the predominantly
political responses to the role of organized entities cases of system criminality. 119
The fact that, largely due to the jurisdictional limitations, neither the ICJ nor any
other court was able to identify a collectivity that was responsible for the genocide
illustrates the shortcomings of the law of international responsibility in dealing
with such entities in system crimes and the need for rethinking of the connection
between international law and system criminality.' 
20
Despite the relatively modest role of international responsibility in relation to
system crimes, it is submitted that state responsibility may play a distinct and
potentially significant role in the responses of the international community to
situations of system criminality. Three considerations are relevant here. First, the
law of international responsibility may at least in theory serve each of the aims that
international law in general may aspire to in regards to situations of system
criminality: termination and prevention of recurrence.'21
Second, in view of the overwhelming dominance of political responses to
situations of system criminality, that only to a relatively limited extent has been
116. See Robert Jennings, International Law Reform and Progressive Development, in LIBER
AMICORUM: PROFESSOR IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN IN HONOUR OF HIS 80 T BIRTHDAY
325, 328 (G Hafner et al. eds., 1998); Martti Koskenniemi, Solidarity Measures: State
Responsibility as a New International Order?, 72 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 337 (2002).
117. Tallgren, supra note 42, at 589.
118. Id.
119. See Genocide Case, supra note 5.
120. See, e.g., Gaeta, supra note 103; Claus KreB, The International Court of Justice and the
Elements of the Crime of Genocide, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 619 (2007); Christian Tomuschat,
Reparation in Cases of Genocide, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 905 (2007); Andrea Gattini,
Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ's Genocide Judgment, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 889 (2007).
121. See Simpson, supra note 4, at 74; Reisman, supra note 112.
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subjected to and embedded in legal procedures and safeguards, 122 the law of
international responsibility can bring an important rule of law quality to the legal
responses to situations of system criminality.1
23
Third, in assessing the role that state responsibility has played, or can play, in
regard to systemic occurrences of international crimes, we should take a broad
look at the type of practices that may be influenced by the law of responsibility.
There is no need to confine us to claims before international courts and tribunals.
The principles play a distinct role in peace treaties by which the legal
consequences of war have been determined and the provisions of which often go to
the heart of the systematic causes of international crimes,124 as well as in the
practice of political organs. 1
25
The fact that the law of state responsbitliy largely, though not exclusively,
functions retrospectively-after the moment where the injury has been caused,
does not necessarily limit the potential relevance of this body of law. In situations
of continuing violations principles of responsibility may both have backward
looking and forward looking effects. Even if the crimes in question may belong to
the past, the conditions that helped them come about (such as a particular piece of
discriminating legislation) may still exist, creating the possibility of re-emergence
of criminality.
It follows that the individual and state responsibility can fulfil complementary
roles. Trindade observes that the current "compartmentalized conception of
international responsibility-of States and individuals-leads ... to the eradication
of impunity in only a partial way.' ' 126 Recognizing the possibility that individual
and state responsibility are both applicable, the ICJ referred in the Genocide Case
to a 'duality of responsibility.' 1
27
Turning the substance of the principles of reparation of the international
responsibility, it seems clear that while many and perhaps all of the principles of
122. Nigel D. White, Responses of political organs to crimes by states, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 314.
123. IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW N INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AT
THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 79-80 (M Nijhoff Publishers 1988).
124. Gattini, supra note 2, at 108-109 (discussing the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration of
Aug. 2 1945).
125. See infra § 5.
126. Trindade, supra note 10 at 259.
127. Genocide Case, supra note 5, 173; See also Franck, supra note 67, at 573 (noting that
"genocide is a hydra-headed monster. It warrants a multifaceted response. The heralded
advent of individual liability should not cloud our understanding of the continued
importance of state responsibility."); BONAFt, supra note 10, at 43, 221.
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reparation are fully applicable to situations of system criminality, not all of them
specifically deal with the systemic conditions of such crimes.
For instance, the principles of cessation and continued performance are as
relevant for system criminality as they are for ordinary wrongful acts. However,
they do not touch upon systemic nature, and the mere fact that a state would return
to performance of the obligation not to torture, would in itself not have any
consequences towards the continued existence of the conditions that facilitated the
act of torture in the first place (such as permissive legislation, moral climate
etcetera).
Likewise, also the normal reparatory functions of remedying damage 28 is
clearly relevant for cases of system criminality. In the Application of the Genocide
Convention case, involving facts that arguably could be characterised in terms of
system criminality, Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed 'normal' restitution and
compensation. 129 Also, in the Lockerbie incident the injured states confined
themselves to demanding that the Government of Libya must "surrender for trial
all those charged with the crime; and accept responsibility for the actions of
Libyan officials" and "pay appropriate compensation," even though it generally
was assumed that the highest organs of the state were involved the Lockerbie
bombing. 130 The fact that the injured state(s), or the international community, may
wish to move beyond normal reparation by invoking (also) aggravated
responsibility, does not exclude 'normal' reparation. However, there is little in the
principles of compensation that is specifically relevant for systematic conditions of
international crimes. Significantly, international law continues to reject punitive
damages. The Inter-American Court of Human rights stated in the Velasquez-
Rodriguez case that the idea of awarding damages to deter or to serve as an
example "is not applicable in international law."'
31
128. See CHRISTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (1987); BIN
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 234-236 (1953).
129. See Genocide Case, supra note 5, 14, 462 (Feb. 26), (eventually the Court rejected the
claim for compensation).
130. Letter dated 20 December 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, UN Doc. S/23308 (Dec.
31, 1991), incorporated in S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc S/Res/731 (Jan. 21, 1992), and S.C.
Res. 748, U.N. Doc S/Res/748 (Mar. 31, 1992). See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1989 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 7, at 38 (July 21, 1989); see also Eri. v. Eth., supra note 65, q26.
See also Andreas Zimmermann & Michael Teichmann, State Responsibility for
International Crimes, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1 at
298.
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For two other forms of reparation, the law of state responsibility may have a
somewhat more direct effect on systemic conditions of international crimes,
however: punishment and guarantees of non-repetition.
4.3 Punishment as form of reparation
Punishment of individuals, that, as indicated in section 3 above, may in certain
conditions have an effect on the systemic conditions of international crimes, in
itself can be part of the obligations of states and a legal consequence of wrongful
acts. The obligation of states to punish individuals, also if they are state officials, is
primarily governed by primary rules. Most of the acts that entail individual
responsibility imply for the state the obligation to prosecute. This is the case for
obligations in relation to torture, 132 war crimes' 33 and genocide. 134 This can also be
based on obligations under human rights treaties; illustrative is the practice of the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights that in its practice since El Amparo v.
Venezuela 13 5 and Veldsquez-Rodriguez, has ordered the state to initiate criminal
investigations into the murders and, if appropriate, punish the responsible parties.
136
The obligation to punish responsible individuals can also be construed as a form
of reparation due by the state to which the act can be attributed. Article 45(2)(d) of
the 1996 ILC draft articles provided that the injured state is entitled to satisfaction
that may consist, in cases where the internationally wrongful act arose from the
serious misconduct of officials or from criminal conduct of officials or private
parties, of disciplinary action against, or punishment of, those responsible. 1
3 7
132. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment arts. 4-7, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987); see, e.g., Godinez
Cruz v. Honduras, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, 184-185 (Jan. 20, 1989) (This
obligation is also based on human rights law, stating that the obligation to punish was part
of the "legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations.").
133. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.S. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
134. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide arts. 4-6, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3405, 78 U.N.T.S 277.
135. See El Amparo v. Venezuela, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 28, 62-62 (Sept. 14,
1996).
136. See generally Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations:
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
351, 351-419 (2007).
137. This is not included in the final articles of the ILC, but is understood to be covered by the
words 'or another appropriate modality' in art. 37(2). See Peter Tomka, International
Liability for Injurous Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International
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The ILC did not appear to have considered in this context acts that were
criminalized by international law and that would result in individual responsibility.
Also the few cases that have arisen in state practice, such as the Aerial Incident
Case 38 and the Rainbow Warrior Case, did not involve acts that entailed
individual culpability under international law.' 39 This also is true for the practice of
human rights courts.1 40 However, punishment as form of satisfaction would appear
to apply afortiori to acts that can be attributed to individuals. 141
4.4 Guarantees of non-repetition
Of particular relevance are guarantees of non-repetition. The obligation to offer
a guarantee of non-repetition in cases of a violation of any primary rule of
Law (Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities), Statement of the
Chairman of the Drafting Committee, at the 5 3rd session of the ILC (1996),
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/english/dcliab.pdf; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 233 (2002).
138. Following the shooting down of an Israeli plane by Bulgarian agents, Israel asked the Court
to take note "of the failure of the Government of Bulgaria to implement its undertaking to
identify and punish the culpable persons." Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.),
1959 I.C.J. 127 (Mar. 5).
139. The UN Secretary General ordered the detention of the two responsible French Service
agents as part of the reparation due to New Zealand. Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.) 74
I.L.R. 271, 272 (1987). Action against the guilty individuals was requested in the case of
the killing in 1948, in Palestine, of Count Bernadotte while he was acting in the service of
the United Nations, see 8 WHITEMAN DIGEST 742-743 (1967) and in the case of the killing
of two United States officers in Tehran, 80:1 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC
257 (1894).
140. See, e.g., Clemente Teherbn et al. v. Colombia, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 2
(June 19, 1998), calling on Columbia to "investigate the acts denounced which gave rise to
these measures, for the purpose of obtaining effective results that would lead to the
discovery and punishment of those responsible." See also Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, 1989
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 8, 31(July 21, 1989). In some cases the distinction
between a remedy and a continued obligation is not drawn sharply. In the Godinez Cruz
Case, id. at No. 5, 184-185, the Court stated that the obligation to punish was part of the
"legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations." See also the
Giraldo Cardona Case (Giraldo Cardona v. Peru), 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 7
(Sept. 30, 1999); Blake v. Guatemala, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 48, 63-65
(Jan. 22, 1999).
141. See Shabtai Rosenne, State Responsibility and International Crimes: Further Reflections on
Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 45
(1998), for Austria commenting on the first draft of the ILC Articles, in that art. 45(2)(d)
should better reflect the growing number of international obligations to prosecute or
extradite individuals. See Int'l L. Comm'n [ILC], State Responsibility: Comments and
observations received from Governments, 111, UN Doc. A/CN.4/488 (Mar. 25, 1998); see
also BONAFE, supra note 10, at 234.
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international law is by now generally accepted.1 42 The International Court of
Justice, in the LaGrand,143 Avena1 44 and DRC v. Uganda cases, 145 took note of the
respective request for such a guarantee by the applicant and has acknowledged in
each of these cases that the responsible state had, in one way or another, already
given such guarantee. The possibility to request a guarantee of non-repetition is not
dependent on the commission of international crimes. 146 Indeed, both LaGrand and
Avena did deal with 'simple' violations of international law certainly not
amounting to 'international crimes'. 14 7 The ILC included the obligation is
contained in art. 30 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility, i.e. in the
general part of Part Two and not in Chapter III thereof, dealing with serious
breaches of peremptory norms. 148
However, the guarantee of non-repetition may have particular relevance in case
of international crimes. The 'Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law' list a
number of forms of guarantees of non-repetition that are particularly relevant.
149
These include:
(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;
142. Giuseppe Palmisano, Les garanties de non-rrprtition entre codification et rdalisation
juridictionnelle du droit: A Propos de l'affaire LaGrand, 106:4 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INT'L PUBLIC 753, 758 (2002); Zimmermann & Teichmann, supra note 130, at 299-301.
143. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513 (Sept. 16).
144. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 69 (Feb.
5).
145. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (De. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
168, para. 257 (Dec. 19),, available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/I 16/10455.pdf.
146. See Elisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad, La sprcifit6 des reparations pour crimes
internationaux, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF INT'L LEGAL ORDER 179 (Christian
Tomuschat et at. eds., 2006).
147. This is also confirmed by the fact that such obligation is contained in art. 30 of the ILC
draft articles on state responsibility, i.e. in the general part of Part Two and not in Chapter
III thereof, dealing with serious breaches of peremptory norms. See Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International
Law Commission at its Fifty-third session (2001), (extract from the Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, Official Records of
the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), ch.IV.E.1).
148. Zimmermann & Teichmann, supra note 130, at 300-301.
149. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex., U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N.
DOC.A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005), available at
www2.ohchr.org/englishllaw/remedy.htm.
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(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by
international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;
(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions,
the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and
international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and
training for law enforcement officials as well as military and security
forces;
(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in
particular international standards, by public servants, including law
enforcement, correctional, media, medical, psychological, social
service and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;
(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts
and their resolution;
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been particularly effective in
applying these principles through a series of specific orders that seek to provide
guarantees of non-repetition. 150 In a growing number of cases, the Court has
ordered changes to national legislation and domestic policies. In Castillo-Petruzzi
v. Peru,15 1 the Court held that "domestic laws that place civilians under the
jurisdiction of the military are a violation of the principles of the American
Convention"; consequently, it ordered Peru "to adopt the appropriate measures to
amend those laws., 1 52 In Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile,153 it required Chile to amend its
national constitution in order to prohibit prior censorship and, ultimately, to allow
for the exhibition of the movie The Last Temptation of Christ. 154 While the latter
case does not deal with system criminality, it does illustrate the power of the Court
to address systemic conditions of wrongful acts. Also in Moiwana Community v.
Suriname, that certainly qualifies as a case involving international crimes, the
150. See generally Antkowiak, supra note 136, at 351-419.
151. Castillo-Petruzzi v. Peru, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, (ser. D) No. 52 (May 30, 1999).
152. Id. 222.
153. The Last Temptation of Christ Case (Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile), 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R
(Ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001).
154. Id. 97-98.
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Court addressed measures aimed at avoiding the repetition of human rights
violations such as "public acts or works that seek, inter alia, to commemorate and
dignify victims, as well as to avoid the repetition of human rights violations".
155
It has been argued that instances of state crimes should lead to an obligation of
the responsible state to change its domestic constitutional structure. De Hoogh
argues that the state responsible for international crimes will "be under an
obligation to change its government, to change its constitution to the extent
necessary, and to hold free elections so as to prevent the recurrence of criminal
acts".156 This might be seen as a particularly intrusive form of guarantees of non-
repetition. However, while in particular cases such domestic changes indeed would
undermine and perhaps remove causes of international crimes, due to a lack of
state practice it cannot be argued that they are required under international law as a
consequence of previously committed state crimes. 157
History has shown a wide variety of other options to respond to situations of
system criminality that in more of less direct forms seek to prevent repetition,
including. Other responses may include coercion to secure the fulfilment of the
obligation and restoration of rights,' 58 deballatio of a state that started a war of
aggression or a genocide, occupation of its territory by UN administration or
otherwise, or imposed measures of arms control.' 59 State practice provides limited
but unequivocal support for these responses, for instance in respect of
administration of Germany and Japan after the Second World War and the
economic sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia and Iraq. At present it cannot be said
that such consequences are part of the customary law of state responsibility.
However, article 41(3) of the ILC Articles provides that the articles' consequences
155. Moiwana Village Case (Moiwana Community v. Suriname), 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 124, 191 (June 15, 2005) (note that the actual orders of the Court in this case
resemble more satisfaction than guarantees of non-repetition).
156. ANDRE DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 195, 197
(Kluwer Law International 1996).
157. Zimmermann & Teichmann, supra note 130, at 301-302.
158. This was the definition of 'sanctions' by the ILC in its early consideration of the concept of
crimes. See Document A/9010/Rev. 1: Report of the International Law Commission on the
work of its twenty-fifth session (7 May-13 July 1973), [1973] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
175, 5 of the commentary to art. 1, U.N. Doc AI9010/Rev.1 (1973).
159. Fifth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 60, 88; See also Bernhard Graefrath &
Manfred Mohr, Legal Consequences of an Act of Aggression: the Case of Iraqi Invasion
and Occupation of Kuwait, 43 AUSTRIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-
128 (1992); PIETER N. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE 296-297 (1959).
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are without prejudice to further consequences that a serious breach of peremptory
norms may entail under international law.16
0
4.5 Implementation
In particular as regards to guarantees of non-repetition, international law thus
may provide for a variety of responses that may undermine the conditions of
systemic criminality. The major weakness of international law then is not so much
the existence and contents of such legal consequences, as the relatively weak
structures for implementation.
In situations of system criminality, we are per definition concerned with crimes
that threaten the fundamental values of the international community.6 In
principle, the legal responses to such crimes also are largely influenced by the
involvement of the international community. This is illustrated by the fact that a
large number of states has brought such crimes within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court and that, when involving the responsibility of a state,
the ILC thought it proper to subject them to a separate Chapter on serious breaches
of peremptory norms of international law. Article 40 of the ILC articles
characterizes this aggravated responsibility by the fact that it flows from "a serious
breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general
international law." 162 The underlying characteristic, also expressed in the definition
of 'serious' in terms of 'systematic' in article 40(2), mostly will be that the acts
that led to the breach of international law were part of a systematic policy of the
state.
It follows from the fact that international crimes affect core foundations of the
international community that the effectuation of responsibility is in the final
analysis thus not in the hands of individual states. The responsibility can be
'pulled' by the international community. 16 3 In regard to state responsibility, this
160. Int'l L. Comm'n [ILC], Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-
third Session, art.59, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001),
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility] (stating
that the draft articles are without prejudice to the Charter of the United Nations).
161. Pellet, supra note 10, at 65-66.
162. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 160, art. 40.
163. Responsibility of individuals or collectives against the international community of course
can co-exist with responsibilities in or towards particular states. In criminal law, it co-exists
with responsibility of individuals in states that have jurisdiction over the crimes. In the law
of state responsibility, it coexists with responsibility towards the injured state(s).
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follows from the fact that in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility injured states
are not, as is the case in regard to 'normal breaches' allowed to waive a claim that
they may have against a responsible state 164 as well as the rights of non-injured
states. 1 5 In regard to individual responsibility this follows from the doctrines of
complementarity in the ICC statute 166 and primacy in the ICTY and the ICTR
statutes.167 However, compared to the procedures that may be applied to enforce
the law of individual responsibility, through the variety of ad hoc and permanent
international and internationalized tribunals, the implementation of the law of state
responsibility faces major weaknesses.
The very systemic nature of the involvement of states in international crimes
that causes these very crimes to occur also causes structural limitations in the
ability of the international legal order to enforce the law of state responsibility
against these states. The implementation of the law of state responsibility "cannot
rise above the implications of sovereignty, which is the dominant conceptual
structure of international law."'168 The sovereignty of states in certain respects
underlies both the possibility of system criminality committed by a state and the
power of the remedial mechanisms provided by the law state responsibility.
The system of state responsibility largely relies on decentralised enforcement,
by relying on invocation by injured 169 or interested 170 states. The latter possibility
is particularly relevant, as it permits States other than the injured State to invoke
the responsibility of another where "the obligation breached is owed to the
international community as a whole," which by definition will be the case in
situations of system criminality. These states may invoke the responsibility of
another to call it to stop the acts that result in international crimes, but precisely in
situations of system criminality, that is unlikely to offer a solution. System
criminality frequently occurs in time of crisis when a government thinks its
legitimacy is being challenged or that the state is under threat.1 71 In these
164. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 160, arts. 20, 45; see also Pellet, supra note 10,
at 70.
165. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 160, art. 48.
166. E.g., Rome Statute supra note 19, art. 17 (Although the principle protects sovereignty and
jurisdiction of states parties, it also allows for the ICC to pull the case if national
prosecution does not satisfy the criteria set forth in the Rome Statute).
167. I.C.T.Y. Statute, supra note 103, art. 7 § 2; I.C.T.R. Statute, supra note 103, art. 8 § 2.
168. lain Scobbie, Assumptions and Presuppositions: State Responsibility for System Crimes, in
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 296.
169. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 160, art. 42.
170. Id. art. 48.
171. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 13, at 34; Scobbie, supra note 168, at 296-297.
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circumstances, "invoking the responsibility of that State might simply be an
exercise in talking to the profoundly deaf."'
172
The same structural features of the international legal order that limit the
chances that a state against which a claim of responsibility is invoked will change
its policies, also at a more technical level may restrict the possibilities that a claim
is brought in the first place. While the law of state responsibility contains certain
innovative features that cater to the interests of the intemational community, such
as article 48, in other respects it remains embedded in and characterised by
traditional sovereignty-based concepts.
One example is the relationship between the regime under article 48 and the law
of diplomatic protection.' 73 Article 48(3) expressly makes the invocation of
responsibility by an interested state subject to the same requirements as invocation
by an injured state, which are contained in articles 43-45. Article 44(a) provides
that a state may not invoke the responsibility of another if "the claim is not brought
in accordance with any applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims. "1 74 This
is hard to reconcile with the Commission's claim, made in the commentary to its
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, that the invocation of responsibility by an
interested state under article 48(1)(b) is not subject to the conditions set out in
article 44, including the nationality of claims rule. 175
The 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection are predicated on the link of
nationality and thus preclude the protection of non-nationals. This ensures that the
"communitarian promise" of article 48(l)(b) remains largely ineffective. This
conclusion is supported by draft article 8 on the protection of refugees. 176 Scobbie
172. Scobbie, supra note 168, at 297.
173. See Id. at 290-293; see also A. Vermeer Kunzli, A Matter of Interest: Diplomatic Protection
and State Responsibility Erga Omnes, 56 I.C.L.Q. 553 (2007).
174. See Commentary to Article 44, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. 128, 2, note 722,
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add. 1.
175. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 61 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 10) at 87, 2, n. 245, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006); compare E. Milano,
Diplomatic protection and human rights before the International Court of Justice: re-
fashioning tradition?, 35 N.Y.I.L. 103-108 (2004).
176. 1. A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person who, at the
date of injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim, is lawfully and
habitually resident in that State.
2. A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who is recognized as a
refugee by that State, in accordance with internationally accepted standards, when that
person, at the date of injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim, is
lawfully and habitually resident in that State.
3. Paragraph 2 does not apply in respect of an injury caused by an internationally wrongful
act of the State of nationality of the refugee.
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rightly asks "[i]f a State cannot seek remedies for non-nationals established within
its territory for injuries caused by their national State, how can it seek the
'performance of the obligation of reparation' for those with whom it lacks all
connection? How could it establish that it was acting in their interest?"' 7
The ILC recognized that the normal principles for implementation would not in
all cases be adequate to achieve the necessary systemic effects. Article 41 provides
for an obligation to cooperate to bring to an end serious breaches of peremptory
norms, for a prohibition of recognition of a situation created by such breaches, and
for a prohibition to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. Both
obligations, usually implemented in the framework of international organizations,
may exert some pressure on states that are involved in systematic criminality, but
at the same time yet have to prove their strengths.
1 78
The situation is essentially different, however, in cases where human rights
courts, with compulsory jurisdiction, have been empowered to address systemic
causes of wrongful acts, in particular in the European Court of Human Rights
79
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,180 and it is indeed in such cases
that the principles of reparation, notably the various forms of guarantees of non-
repetition, acquire most power to undermine the conditions for system criminality.
V. Implementation through the Security Council
While the law of state responsibility thus has some normative potential for
dealing with the systemic causes of international crimes, it also is clear that the
practical effect is limited by the legal power of courts to give effect to the law. In
these situations a dominant role will be played by political organs, at regional and
global levels. Indeed, as indicated above, states have preferred to keep the
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 8, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. (No. 10),
U.N. Doc A/61/10 (2002).
177. Scobbie, supra note 168.
178. See Stefan Talmon, The Duty Not to 'Recognize as Lawful' a Situation Created by the
Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation
without Real Substance?, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 101-125 (Christian Tomuschat &
Jean-Mark Thouvenin eds., Nijhoff 2006).
179. Particularly noteworthy is the practice of the Court in regards to the so-called pilot case, see
Luzius Wildhaber, Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems on the
National Level, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY
APPLICATIONS: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 69-75 (Riidiger Wolfrum & Ulrike
Deutsch eds., Springer 2009).
180. See infra text accompanying notes 148-53.
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consequences of state involvement in international crimes to such political organs,
rather than to the law of state responsibility and to the power of international
courts. Key among such political organs of course is the Security Council. Indeed,
the international community has channelled most of their responses to situations
such as the crisis in Darfur through the Council.
181
Although states may have considered the political organs as a preferred
alternative to the (implementation of) the law of international responsibility, strict
dichotomies are not warranted. Though initial proposals for explicit references to
the Council in the work of the ILC were rejected, 182 the Council has a distinct role
in regard to the law of state responsibility. Indeed, the Council provides the best
solution given the decentralized nature of the international legal system, which
otherwise is rather powerless to respond to the category of international crimes.' 
83
The Council can act in a complementary way, both in regard to individual
responsibility by triggering the jurisdiction of the ICC,184 and in regard to the
involvement of states in international crimes.
The fact that the Security Council acts within the legal context of the Charter
also means that the Council cannot separate itself from the established body of
secondary rules, for instance on matters of attribution. Indeed, against the
overwhelming dominance of political responses to situations of system criminality,
that only to a relatively limited extent has been subjected to and embedded in legal
procedures and safeguards,' 85 the law of international responsibility can bring an
important rule of law quality to the legal responses to situations of system
criminality. 1
86
Multilateral responses, including those by the Security Council, to breaches of
international law may well be construed in terms of allocation and implementation
181. See Clapham, supra note 79, at 922-923.
182. See also Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Security Council's "Law-Making, " 83 RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 747, 753 (2000).
183. Roberto Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility: The International Wrongful Act of the
State, Source of International Responsibility (continued), in [1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
43-44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318; see also the discussion of Article 30, Countermeasures in
Respect of an Internationally Wrongful Act, in Report of the International Law Commission
on the work of its Thirty-first session, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 118-119, U.N.
Doc. A/34/10 (1979); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and
Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 71 (1994).
184. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 16.
185. White, supra note 122.
186. BROWNLEE, supra note 123, at 79-80.
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of responsibility. 187 Responses by the Council to situations of system criminality
can be seen as a measures being taken on behalf of the injured state (perhaps also
peoples and groups within states) in matters which affect the interests of the
international community as a whole.
88
Moreover, there is a direct, though not necessary, link between its mandate to
restore and maintain the peace, the removal of causes of system criminality, and
the principles of state responsibility. Although determinations of a threat to the
peace do not depend on prior determinations of a wrong,' 8 9 the Council often
combines determinations of a threat to the peace with determination of a breach of
an obligation. Such findings provide the basis for legal sanctions that are not very
dissimilar from consequences of state responsibility. 190
On many occasions the Council has made determinations of illegality in
situations of system criminality. 191 For instance, in Resolution 1574 (Sudan), it
condemned all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all
parties. 192 In Resolution 1865 (Ivory Coast), it condemned all violations of
international humanitarian law.' 93 In Resolution 1572 (Ivory Coast), it condemned
the air strikes committed by the national armed forces of C6te d'Ivoire (FANCI),
stating that these "constitute flagrant violations of the ceasefire agreement of 3
May 2003.' 9 In addition, on many occasions the Security Council has determined
breaches of resolutions itself For instance, in Resolution 1591 (Sudan), the
Council deplored "that the Government of Sudan and rebel forces and all other
187. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 181-84 (1994). A similar broad conception is adopted by Triffterer, supra note 18,
at 343 (referring to the sanctions imposed or authorized by the Security Council as one
example of 'prosecution' of states for crimes of state); See also MATTHIAS HERDEGEN,
BEFUGNISSE DES UN-SICHERHEITSRATES: AUFGEKLARTER ABSOLUTISMUS IM
VOLKERRECHT [POWERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: ENLIGHTENED ABSOLUTISM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 20 (C.F. MOller, Heidelberg, 1998)(stating that "[in der Regel wird
eine Friedensbedrohung durch die schwerwiegende Verletzung von V61kerrechtspflichten
begriindet."); Bernhard Graefrath, International Crimes - A Specific Regime of
International Responsibility of States and its Legal Consequences, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC's DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 161-64. (Joseph H. H. Weiler et al. eds., De Gruyter 1988).
188. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 183.
189. Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and the New Threats to the Peace: Back to the
Future, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 15, 50 (2003) (U.K.).
190. Jean-Marc Sorel, L'61argissement de la notion de menace contre la paix, in LE CHAPITRE
VII DE LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, COLLOQUE DE RENNES 3, 3-57 (1995) (Fr.).
191. Id. at 63-64.
192. S.C. Res. 1574, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1574 (Nov. 19,2004).
193. S.C. Res. 1865, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1865 (Oct. 13, 2009).
194. S.C. Res. 1572, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004).
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armed groups in Darfur have failed to comply fully with their commitments and
the demands of the Council referred to in resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004),
and 1574 (2004)." 195
In such cases, there exists indeed a close relationship between the fundamental
norms of the Charter (Art. 39), and determinations of the occurrence of systematic
international crimes.' 96 The condemned acts at the same time constituted a
violation of peremptory norms of international law and international crimes, as
well as a threat to the peace.
As to the consequences of determinations of international crimes involving
wrongful acts by states, the Council commonly calls for cessation of the violations
of international law, conforming to the prime consequences of an internationally
wrongful act. 19 7 Moreover, the Council has at its possession several options attuned
to the nature of system criminality. The Council can provide for the nullity or
invalidity of laws that provide conditions of international crimes.198 Such
resolutions do not create invalidity at domestic level, but do entail legal
consequences. 199 The Council also can call for collective non-recognition that may
put pressure on states and undermine the systemic base of international crimes.
Of particular importance in addressing situations of system criminality are
measures aimed at demobilization and reintegration of members of armed
forces;200 the unification and restructuring of defence and security forces;
201
military training, including in the area of human rights, international humanitarian
law, child protection and the prevention of gender-based violence; 20 2 developing
capacities of police forces to act in accordance with international standards; and
strengthening the judicial system.203 Such measures bear a distinct resemblance to
what the Basic Principles envisaged under the heading guarantees of non-
repetition.
In Resolution 1572 (Ivory Coast), the Council demanded that the Ivoirian
authorities stop all radio and television broadcasting inciting hatred, intolerance
195. S.C. Res. 1591, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005).
196. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 183, at 66.
197. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1828, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1828 (July 31, 2008).
198. S.C. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965).
199. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
200. E.g., S.C. Res. 1856, i, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 856 (Dec. 22, 2008).
201. S.C. Res.1865, supra note 193.
202. See supra note 141.
203. S.C. Res. 1756, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 756 (May 15, 2007).
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and violence, and requested UNOCI to strengthen its monitoring role in this
regard.2 4
On many occasions, the Council aimed to remove means of support, and in that
respect undermine the systemic causes of international crimes, for instance in
regard to arms, assistance, advice or training related to military activities. 20 5 Also
highly relevant are sanctions aimed at freezing financial assets. 20 6 While such
measures often are linked to individuals, they can drain the financial resources of
the collectivity.
20 7
The political procedures to which implementation of aggravated state
responsibility commonly is subjected have obvious limitations and problems.
Determinations of breaches of international law by the Council do not amount to
judicial determinations. The Council is a political organ that is used, or not used,
for political reasons, and whose procedure is not attuned to legal determinations. It
also has, for instance, no proper rules on production of evidence, equality of arms
etc.-which cause a continued disconcerting discrepancy between the enforcement
of individual responsibility and the enforcement of state responsibility.
But then again, much of the application of principles of state responsibly is
outside the courts anyway and in that respect also lacks impartiality. In that
respect, the Council while leaving much desired, is not worse than the normal
situation of unilateral countermeasures responding to unilateral determinations of
international wrongs. Indeed, much of the practice of the Council can be seen as a
form of institutional countermeasures that to some extent overcomes the
limitations of unilateral countermeasures, in particular collective (but not
institutionalized) countermeasures. 208 Moreover, if the Council in the operative
paragraphs of a resolution determines the violation of a peremptory norm of
international law, 20 9 such a finding at least is a prima facie assessment of
204. See S.C. Res. 1572, supra note 194.
205. S.C. Res. 1857, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008); S.C. Res. 1572, supra note 194.
206. S.C. Res. 1857, supra note 205; S.C. Res. 1591, supra note 195, at 4; S.C. Res. 1572, supra
note 194, at 3.
207. See Osiel, supra note 69, at 1842-1848 (recommending financial drainage of such
organizations as highly effective, while less stigmatizing).
208. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 183, at 73. There is one drawback: whereas unilateral
countermeasures always may be subject to a subsequent review and determination for being
based on an incorrect assessment of an international wrong, that is not so in the case of the
Council. Id. at 74. Also note that not in all cases did this involve a failure to conform to the
requirements towards a target state as in other cases. Id. at 77.
209. The determination of a threat to the peace under article 39 in itself has no binding effect
outside that context. See Jochen A. Frowein, Legal Consequences for International Law
Enforcement in Case of Security Council Inaction, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
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illegality, 210 that could trigger the secondary obligations under the law of state
responsibility.
VI. Conclusion
The law of individual responsibility and the law of collective responsibility are
largely complementary. The major challenge is to combine both approaches within
an integrated analytical framework in which the disadvantages of one approach are
offset by the advantages of the other and vice versa.
Individual responsibility may in certain cases have effects on the systemic
conditions of international crimes, in particular where international crimes are
committed or induced by a limited number of persons who constitute the
leadership of a small group. However, the very nature of system criminality
obliterates the piecemeal approach of criminal law. Criminal law is not capable of
capturing the complex mechanisms and relations of organizations which engage in
mass crimes. It provides a distorted and fragmentized picture of reality in which
the blame rests on a few individuals who, understandably, resent their being
sacrificed as scapegoats.
State responsibility epitomizes a more holistic approach which recognizes the
responsibility of the wider periphery of bystanders who, though not directly
involved, create the breeding ground for mass atrocity. However, its effects are
significantly limited as a result of the weak framework for implementation. While
a change in the general principles of the law of state responsibility governing
implementation is unlikely, more may be expected from the role of human rights
courts, on the one hand, and a strengthened rule of law quality of the activities of
political organs, notably the Security Council in regard to system criminality.2
The power of international criminal justice to better respond to the situations of
mass atrocities that have inspired its evolution, will largely depend on its ability to
transcend individuality and to integrate individual and collective responsibility in a
complementary framework that matches the dynamics that cause international
crimes to happen in the first place.
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210. Wellens, supra note 189, at 51-52.
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